Successful deployment of privacy preserving collaborative applications, like statistical analysis, benchmarking, and optimizations, requires more efficient secure computation with real numbers. We present a complete family of protocols for secure floating-point arithmetic, constructed using a small set of building blocks that preserve data privacy using well known primitives based on Shamir secret sharing and related cryptographic techniques. Using new building blocks and optimizations and simpler secure fixed-point arithmetic, we obtain floating-point protocols with substantially improved efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
Secure computation enables groups of parties to run collaborative applications without having to reveal their private inputs: data privacy is preserved throughout the computation by cryptographic protocols. Various applications that require secure arithmetic with real numbers have been studied and implemented (Aliasgari et al., 2017; Bogdanov et al., 2018; Kamm and Willemson, 2015; Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010b) . However, the performance penalty caused by cryptographic protocols remains an important deterrent for the deployment of these applications and motivates further research on improving current solutions (Dimitrov et al., 2016; Krips and Willemson, 2014) .
Two frameworks based on secret sharing offer comprehensive support for multiparty secure computation with real numbers. The first framework (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a; Catrina and Saxena, 2010) provides a solid foundation for secure fixedpoint computation, demonstrated by solving linear programming problems with private data (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010b) . Privacy is protected using well known primitives based on Shamir secret sharing and related techniques (Cramer et al., 2015; Cramer et al., 2005) . Follow-up work added protocols for secure floating-point computation (Aliasgari et al., 2013) and related applications (Aliasgari et al., 2017) . The other framework, Sharemind, was developed in parallel and relies on additive secret sharing. Its protocols for computing with real numbers have been gradually optimized (Krips and Willemson, 2014) and used in various applications (Bogdanov et al., 2018; Kamm and Willemson, 2015) . These frameworks offer similar a https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7498-9881 security and performance for passive adversary (extension to active adversary is still expensive).
An initial goal of our project was to extend the first framework with building blocks and optimizations that offer better support for secure computation with real numbers. In this paper, we show how these extensions are used to obtain important performance gains for secure floating-point arithmetic.
The protocols provide the basic functionality and accuracy expected by typical applications, for practical range and precision settings. We focus on improving protocol performance and enabling trade-offs between performance and precision based on application requirements, rather than replicating the format and features specified in the IEEE Standard for Floating-Point Arithmetic (IEEE 754) . Also, we aim at simplifying the protocols, by using a small set of components and constructions. We selected solutions that offer better trade-offs for the entire protocol family, rather than optimizing particular tasks. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is an overview of the secure computation framework, data encoding, and main building blocks. Section 3 presents the new family of protocols for secure floating-point arithmetic: addition and subtraction, multiplication, division, square root, and comparison. We summarize the main results in Section 4. putation using secret sharing (Cramer et al., 2015) and various optimizations presented in the literature (Cramer et al., 2005; Damgård et al., 2006; Damgård and Thorbek, 2007; Reistad and Toft, 2009 ). We start with an overview of this framework.
Suppose that n > 2 parties, P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n , communicate on secure channels and want to perform a joint computation where party P i has private input x i and expects output y i . The parties use a linear secretsharing scheme to create a distributed state of the computation where each party has a random share of each secret variable. Then, they compute with these shared variables to obtain the desired outputs, by running secure computation protocols.
Assuming perfectly secure channels and random number generators, these protocols offer perfect or statistical privacy: the views of protocol executions (all values seen by an adversary) can be simulated such that the distributions of real and simulated views are perfectly or statistically indistinguishable, respectively. Let X and Y be distributions with finite sample spaces V and W . The statistical distance between X and Y is ∆(X,Y ) = 1 2 ∑ v∈V W |Pr(X = v) − Pr(Y = v)|. The distributions are perfectly indistinguishable if ∆(X,Y ) = 0 and statistically indistinguishable if ∆(X,Y ) is negligible in some security parameter. With real-life secure channels and pseudo-random numbers, the protocols offer computational security.
The core primitives use Shamir secret sharing over a finite field F. These primitives provide secure arithmetic in F with perfect privacy against a passive threshold adversary able to corrupt t out of n parties. In this model, the parties do not deviate from the protocol and any t + 1 parties can reconstruct a secret, while t or less parties cannot distinguish it from random values in F. We assume |F| > n, to enable Shamir sharing, and n > 2t, for multiplication of secret-shared values. Support for stronger adversary models can be added using various techniques, albeit with substantial performance degradation.
In this paper, we focus on protocols that use the field of integers modulo a prime q, denoted Z q . However, binary computations can be optimized by working in a small field F 2 8 (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a; Catrina and Saxena, 2010) . The parties locally compute addition/subtraction of shared field elements by adding/subtracting their own shares. Tasks that involve multiplication of shared values require interaction and are computed by dedicated protocols.
The protocols overcome the limitations of secure arithmetic with shared field elements, by combining secret sharing with additive or multiplicative hiding: for a shared variable x the parties jointly generate a secret random value r , compute y = x + r or 
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1 1 y = x · r and reveal y; this is similar to one-time pad encryption of x with key r. For secret x ∈ Z q and random uniform r ∈ Z q we obtain ∆(x + r mod q, r) = 0 and ∆(xr mod q, r) = 0, hence perfect privacy. For x ∈ [0, 2 k − 1], random uniform r ∈ [0, 2 k+κ − 1], and q > 2 k+κ+1 we obtain ∆(x + r mod q, r) < 2 −κ , hence statistical privacy with security parameter κ. Solutions with statistical privacy substantially simplify the protocols by avoiding wraparound modulo q, although they require larger q for a given data range. We evaluate the protocols using complexity metrics that focus on interaction between parties. Communication complexity measures the amount of data sent by each party. For our protocols, a suitable metric is the number of invocations of 3 primitives during which every party sends a share to the others: input sharing, multiplication, and secret reconstruction. Round complexity is the number of sequential invocations and is relevant for network latency. Table 1 shows the complexity of the core primitives.
The protocols offer best performance for implementations that apply the following basic optimizations. Interactive operations that do not depend on each other are executed in parallel, in a single round. In particular, all shared random values can be precomputed in parallel. We use Pseudo-random Replicated Secret Sharing (PRSS) (Cramer et al., 2005) and its integer variant (RISS) (Damgård and Thorbek, 2007) to generate without interaction shared random field elements and integers, and random sharings of 0. Some shared random values cannot be generated without interaction (e.g., random bits shared in Z q ). We indicate separately the communication complexity of the precomputation round.
Data Types and Data Encoding. We consider secure computation with the following data types: binary values, signed integers, fixed-point numbers, and floating-point numbers. For secure computation, they are encoded in a finite field F. We distinguish different representations of a number as follows: we denotẽ x a fixed-point number,x the integer value encoding x, x the field element that encodesx, and x a sharing of x; a floating-point number is denotedx. The no-tation x = (condition)? a : b means that x is assigned the value a when condition = true and b otherwise.
Logical values f alse,true and bit values 0, 1 are encoded as 0 F and 1 F , respectively. F can be either Z q or a small binary field F 2 m . This encoding allows efficient secure evaluation of Boolean functions using secure arithmetic in F (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a) .
Signed integer types are defined as
They are encoded in Z q by the function fld : Z k → Z q , fld(x) =x mod q, for a prime q > 2 k+κ , where κ is the security parameter (similar to two's complement encoding). This method enables efficient secure integer arithmetic using secure arithmetic in Z q : for anyx 1 ,x 2 ∈ Z k and ∈ {+, −, ·}, we havex 1 x 2 = fld −1 (fld(x 1 ) fld(x 2 )); also, ifx 2 |x 1 thenx 1 /x 2 = fld −1 (fld(x 1 ) · fld(x 2 ) −1 ). Signed fixed-point types are sets of rational numbers defined as
and encoded in Z q as described above. Secure multiplication and division of fixed-point numbers require q > 2 2k+κ .
Floating-point numbersx ∈ Q FL l,g are tuples v,p, s, z , wherev ∈ [2 −1 , 2 − 1] ∪ {0} is the unsigned, normalized significand,p ∈ Z g is the signed exponent, s = (x < 0)? 1 : 0, and z = (x = 0)? 1 : 0. The value of the number isx = (1 −2s)·v ·2p. Ifx = 0 then z = 1,v = 0, andp = −2 g−1 . This encoding of x = 0 simplifies secure addition with minimal negative effects on other operations. The integer significand and exponent are encoded as described above.
The parameters k, f , and g are not secret. The protocols work for any setting of these parameters that satisfies the type definitions. The applications usually need k ∈ [32, 128], k = 2 f , ∈ [24, 64] and g ∈ [8, 15], depending on range and accuracy requirements.
The floating-point protocols are constructed using a subset of the building blocks introduced in (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a; Catrina and Saxena, 2010) , enhanced by optimizations added in (Catrina, 2018) . All building blocks rely on the secure computation model described above for their own security and secure composition. We summarize in the following their functionality and the optimizations 1 . Table 2 lists their online and precomputation complexity.
1 Further details are available in the Appendix.
Multiplication and Inner Product. Standard multiplication of Shamir-shared field elements requires an interaction. However, this interaction can be avoided in some cases. Denote x u,i the share of x owned by P i , for a random polynomial of degree u; the default value of the degree is t. The multiplication protocol computes c ← a b as follows (Cramer et al., 2015) : for all i ∈ [1, n], P i locally computes a i b i ; the result is c 2t,i , a share of c for a non-random polynomial of degree 2t (product of the polynomials used to share a and b); then, P i shares the value c 2t,i by sending to the others c 2t,i j , for j ∈ [1, n], j = i; finally, P i computes its own share c i from the received shares, by Lagrange interpolation.
A first optimization applies to multiplications followed by additive hiding: d ← Reveal( a b + r ). With standard protocols, this computation needs 2 rounds. We can avoid the first round by locally randomizing the share products: for all i ∈ [1, n], party i computes c 2t,i ← a i b i + 0 2t,i , where 0 2t,i are pseudo-random shares of 0 generated with PRZS(2t) (Cramer et al., 2005) . We denote a * b this local operation. The computation can now be completed with a single interaction:
where RevealD is the secret reconstruction protocol for polynomials of degree 2t.
This situation occurs very often. In particular, many of the protocols discussed below use additive hiding of the input. We add variants of these protocols for input shared with a random polynomial of degree 2t, and distinguish them by the suffix 'D'. The difference is that they use RevealD instead of Reveal.
Another optimization is used to compute the inner product of two vectors, c ← ∑ m k=1 a k b k , in the protocol InnerProd: the parties locally compute the inner product of their own shares and re-share the result. Thus, InnerProd needs a single interaction (instead of m interactions). If InnerProd is followed by additive hiding of its output, we can also use the previous optimization. We call InnerProdD a variant that locally computes c 2t,i ← ∑ m k=1 a k i b k i + 0 2t,i .
Multiplication and Division by 2 m . The floatingpoint arithmetic protocols are built using a small set of related protocols that efficiently computeb =ā · 2 m andc ≈ā/2 m , for secretā,b,c ∈ Z k and public or secret integer m ∈ [0, k − 1]. If m is public we computeā · 2 m without interaction. To computeā/2 m , we use the protocols Div2m and Div2mP, introduced in (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a; Catrina and Saxena, 2010) . Div2m rounds to −∞ and Div2mP rounds probabilistically to the nearest integer. We denote their outputs ā/2 m and ā/2 m , respectively. Div2mP computesc = 
Task
(e.g., ifā = 46 and m = 3 thenā/2 m = 5.75; the output isc = 6 with probability p = 0.75 orc = 5 with probability 1 − p = 0.25). For both protocols, the rounding error is |δ| < 1 and the output is exact if 2 m dividesā. Div2mP is much more efficient (Table 2) and its output is likely more accurate. Div2 is a more efficient solution for ā/2 . Finally, the comparison protocol LTZ uses Div2m to compute
If m is secret we have to extend the collection of building blocks in (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a) . The goal is to use the following constructions. We start by computing the secret bits {x i } k−1 i=0 , x i = (m = i)? 1 : 0. This allows us to locally compute 2 m = ∑ k−1 i=0 x i 2 i and thenā · 2 m . Moreover, we can use a similar method forā/2 m : compute the secret integersd i = { ā/2 i } k−1 i=0 and the inner productā/2 m = ∑ k−1 i=0 x idi . The protocol PreDiv2m, suggested in (Catrina, 2018) , is a generalization of Div2m that efficiently computes { ā/2 i } m i=1 with secret inputs and outputs. Surprisingly, it performs a much more complex task than Div2m in the same number of rounds, with a modest increase of the communication complexity (Table 2) . PreDiv2mP is a generalization of Div2mP that computes { ā/2 i } m i=1 with probabilistic rounding to nearest, with the same complexity as Div2mP.
Protocol 1, Int2MaskG, is a generic construction for computing
The coefficients a i, j are pre-computed from public information (the points
The online complexity is 5 rounds and k + m + 2 interactive operations.
We present a family of floating-point arithmetic protocols for addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, square root, and comparison. We focus on solutions that offer the best tradeoffs for the entire family and a broader range of applications. All protocols are constructed using the techniques discussed in Section 2, that support secure protocol composition. The same security arguments apply to the entire family, so we do not repeat them for each protocol.
Converting Fixed-point Numbers to Floatingpoint Numbers. Given a fixed-point numberã ∈ Q FX k, f , Protocol 2, FX2FL, computes v,p, s, z so that a = (1 − 2s)v2p ∈ Q FL ,g ,â ≈ã and z = (â = 0)? 1 : 0, with secret input and output. In particular, for f = 0, the input is an integerā ∈ Z k and the output iŝ a ∈ Q FL ,g so thatâ ≈ā. FX2FL is also used for normalizing the output of floating-point arithmetic protocols.
The computation can be summarized as follows.
Steps 1-6 compute s = (ā < 0)? 1 : 0 and z = (ā = 0)? 1 : 0, together with data used in steps 6-10 for computingv andp:
, the binary encoding of |ā|, and
Steps 7-10 computev. We start by computing
. At least one of these values is 0, so step 9 obliviously handles both cases by computingv
Step 11 computesp.
The online complexity is 9 rounds and 5k + 3 interactive operations. If the sign is not secret, we can skip step 1 and the complexity becomes 6 rounds and 4k + 2 operations. FX2FL is simpler and more efficient than the protocol given in (Aliasgari et al., 2013) , which needs log k + 12 rounds and more than (log k + 3)k operations. The improvement is due to more efficient solutions enabled by PreDiv2m for computing the secret index m and the multiplication and division by secret 2 |l−m| .
We also need FX2FLE, a general tool for normalizing the output of floating-point arithmetic protocols. FX2FLE is a variant of FX2FL that takes a secret integerx as additional input and returns v,p, s, z so
in parallel with the computation ofv (the round complexity is the same).
Floating-point Addition and Subtraction
The basic idea is to align the inputs' radix point, add the significands and normalize the result using FX2FLE. To simplify the notation, supposeâ 1 ≥ 0, a 2 ≥ 0, andp 1 ≥p 2 . We wantv andp so that v2p ≈v 1 2p 1 +v 2 2p 2 . We can align to the larger exponent, by settingp =p 1 andv =v 1 + v 2 /2p 1 −p 2 , or to the smaller exponent, by settingp =p 2 andv = v 1 2p 1 −p 2 +v 2 . Which method is better? Multiplication by secret 2p 1 −p 2 is simpler than division, but here it is inefficient, since the result can be huge. One solution is to combine the methods: use the first method whenp 1 −p 2 ≥ , because v 2 /2p 1 −p 2 = 0; otherwise, use the second method, becausev 1 2p 1 −p 2 < 2 2 . AddFL uses the first method, which can be implemented more efficiently with the new building blocks.
Steps 1-3 swap the inputs ifp 1 <p 2 : (v 1 ,p 1 ) = (p 1 <p 2 )? ((1 − 2s 2 )v 2 ,p 2 ) : ((1 − 2s 1 )v 1 ,p 1 ) and (v 2 ,p 2 ) = (p 1 <p 2 )? ((1 − 2s 1 )v 1 ,p 1 ) : ((1 − 2s 2 )v 2 ,p 2 ). Swap computes (c = 1)? (y, x) : (x, y) with secret inputs and outputs. Since we encodeâ = 0 asv = 0 andp = −2 g−1 (smallest value), null operands are not special cases: ifâ 2 = 0 thenp 1 ≥p 2 and v 2 = 0, so the protocol setsp =p 1 andv =v 1 ; if a 1 = 0,p 1 <p 2 and the operands are swapped.
Let
Step 8 normalizes the result. If s 1 = s 2 and ∆ = 1, |v 1 −v 2 /2| can be close to the rounding error, compromising the accuracy. This is avoided by settingv 1 = 2v 1 ,v 2 = 2v 2 , so that the division is exact, and invoking FX2FLE with k = + 3 andp 1 =p 1 − 1.
The online complexity AddFL is 19 rounds and 6 +2g+26 interactive operations. For operands with the same, known sign the complexity is 16 rounds and 5 + 2g + 10 operations (due to simpler normalization). With minor changes, AddFL also works when one operand is public, with roughly the same complexity. The protocol proposed in (Aliasgari et al., 2013) needs log + 30 rounds and more than (log + 14) + 9g operations. The improvement is due to more efficient building blocks and the simpler algorithm enabled by PreDiv2mP and Int2MaskG.
Floating-point multiplication. Protocol 4, MulFL, computesâ ≈â 1â2 , for secretâ 1 ,â 2 ,â ∈ Q FL ,g ,â 1 = (1 − 2s 1 )v 1 2p 1 ,â 2 = (1 − 2s 2 )v 2 2p 2 ,â = (1 − 2s)v2p. The protocol computesv 3 =v 1v2 andp 3 =p 1 +p 2 and normalizes the result. Sincev 3 ∈ [2 2 −2 , 2 2 − 2 +1 + 1] ∪ {0}, normalization is easy: ifv 3 < 2 2 −1 thenv = v 3 /2 −1 andp =p 3 + − 1, otherwisē v = v 3 /2 andp =p 3 + . Also, we efficiently compute s = s 1 ⊕ s 2 , z = z 1 ∨ z 2 , andp =p(1 − z) − z2 g−1 .
We can reduce the communication complexity by modifying the algorithm as follows: computev 3 = v 1v2 /2 −1 ∈ [2 −1 , 2 +1 − 2 2 ] ∪ {0} andp 3 =p 1 + p 2 + −1; ifv 3 < 2 then setv =v 3 andp =p 3 ; otherwise, setv = v 3 /2 andp =p 3 +1. A similar method is used in (Aliasgari et al., 2013) . Our protocol is an optimized variant.
Steps 1-3 compute v 3 ,p 3 , s, z as explained above and step 4 normalizes the result using Protocol 5, NormFLS. We use fast truncation with Div2mP, becausev 3 is in the range [2 −1 , 2 +1 − 1] ∪ {0} required for simple normalization regardless of the rounding method (actually, we use Div2mPD, so that the multiplication v 1 v 2 is computed without interaction).
NormFLS normalizesv ∈ [2 −1 , 2 +1 − 1] ∪ {0} using the algorithm described above: it computes (in parallel) b = (v < 2 )? 1 : 0 andv = v/2 , then v = (b = 1)?v :v andp = (b = 1)?p(1 − z) :
The online complexity of MulFL is 5 rounds and + 9 interactive operations (instead of 11 rounds and 8 +10 operations reported in (Aliasgari et al., 2013) ).
MulFL also works when one of the operands is public, with minor changes and slightly lower complexity.
Floating-point Division. Protocol 6, DivFL, computesâ ≈â 1 /â 2 , for secretâ 1 ,â 2 ,â ∈ Q FL ,g ,â 1 = (1 − 2s 1 )v 1 2p 1 ,â 2 = (1 − 2s 2 )v 2 2p 2 ,â 2 = 0, andâ = (1 − 2s)v2p. DivFL divides the significands using secure fixed-point arithmetic and normalizes the result. Letṽ 1 =v 1 2 − ,ṽ 2 =v 2 2 − andṽ 3 =ṽ 1 /ṽ 2 . Observe thatṽ 1 ,ṽ 2 ∈ [0.5, 1) ∪ {0},ṽ 2 = 0 andṽ 3 ∈ (0.5, 2) ∪ {0}.
Step 1 computesṽ 3 using Protocol 7, DivGS, and steps 2-3 computep 3 =p 1 −p 2 − and s = s 1 ⊕ s 2 (z = z 1 ). DivGS returnsv 3 ∈ [2 −1 , 2 +1 − 1] ∪{0} and v 3 =ṽ 3 2 , so we can use NormFLS for normalization.
The protocol DivGS is based on a variant of Goldschmidt's division algorithm (Markstein, 2004) . Let a, b ∈ R, b = 0. The algorithm starts with an initial approximation w 0 ≈ 1/b, with relative error ε 0 < 1, and computes a/b iteratively, as follows:
, we can start with w 0 = 2.9142 − 2b, a linear approximation of 1/b with relative error ε 0 < 0.08578 (Ercegovac and Lang, 2003) . It provides about 3.5 exact bits, so for -bit inputs the algorithm needs θ = log 3.5 iterations.
DivGS uses this algorithm to computeṽ 3 ≈ṽ 1 /ṽ 2 with absolute error δ < 2 − , forṽ 1 ,ṽ 2 ∈ [0.5, 1) ∪ {0}, v 2 = 0, andṽ 3 ∈ [0.5, 2) ∪ {0}. The inputs and the output are fixed-point numbers with resolution 2 − , encoded asv 1 ,v 2 ∈ [2 −1 , 2 − 1] ∪ {0},v 2 = 0, and v 3 ∈ [2 −1 , 2 +1 − 1] ∪ {0}. Fixed-point multiplication with resolution 2 − is computed as double-precision integer multiplication followed by truncation that cuts off the least significant bits. The rounding error due to truncation is δ t < 2 − .
return v 3 ; 11 We prefer this algorithm to other variants (e.g., Newton-Raphson) because the two multiplications of an iteration can be computed in parallel. On the other hand, its iterations are not self-correcting, so rounding errors accumulate, reducing the accuracy of the result. Moreover, if the error before the last truncation is |δ| ≥ 2 − ,v 3 may be outside the range [2 −1 , 2 +1 − 1] ∪ {0} required by fast normalization with NormFLS. For instance, ifv 1 = 2 −1 andv 2 = 2 − 1 the output can bev 3 < 2 −1 (ṽ 1 = 0.5,ṽ 2 ≈ 1, v 3 ≈ 0.5); also, ifv 1 = 2 −1 andv 2 = 2 −1 , the output can bev 3 > 2 +1 − 1 (ṽ 1 ≈ 1,ṽ 2 = 0.5,ṽ 3 ≈ 2).
Let ∆ be the accumulated error before the last truncation and suppose ∆ < γ · 2 − for variables with -bit fractional part. The error can be reduced by terminating the algorithm with a modified Newton-Raphson iteration (Markstein, 2004) ; this requires additional rounds. DivGS reduces the error to ∆ < 2 − by increasing the fractional part to + m bits, with m = log γ . For our initial approximation, error analysis shows that we need m = 3 for ∈ [8, 14] (θ = 2) and m = 4 for ∈ [15, 112] (θ ∈ [3, 5]). For simplicity, we set m = 4 in the pseudocode 2 . DivGS computes Goldschmidt's iterations for secret inputs and outputs. Steps 1-3 initialize the algorithm: compute θ, m, and k = +m; setv 1 =v 1 2 m and v 2 =v 2 2 m to obtain fixed-point numbers with frac-tional part of + m bits; computew =β − 2v 2 , the initial approximation of 1/ṽ 2 . Steps 4-6 compute in parallel the initial values for the iteration variables: c =v 1w /2 k andd = (1 −v 2 )w/2 k . Steps 7-10 are the θ iterations of the algorithm. An iteration computes in parallelc =c + (cd)/2 k andd ← d 2 /2 k and then setsd =d . The result is in the interval required for fast normalization regardless of the rounding method of the last truncation, so we can use Div2mP.
The online complexity of DivFL is 5 + θ rounds and + 2θ + 7 interactive operations (e.g., 9 rounds and + 16 operations for ∈ [29, 56] ). DivFL is more accurate and more efficient than the protocol given in (Aliasgari et al., 2013) , which does not address the critical accuracy issues discussed above and needs 2 log + 7 rounds and 2( + 2) log + 3 + 8 operations. The complexity improvement is due to better initial approximation (less iterations) and more efficient secure fixed-point arithmetic.
An alternative approach to floating-point division with secret inputs and output, suggested in related work, is to first compute the reciprocalâ 2 = 1/â 2 and thenâ 3 =â 1 ·â 2 . However, DivFL has the same complexity as a protocol that computes 1/â 2 and avoids the additional secure floating-point multiplication. Also, with minor changes, DivFL can computê a 3 =â 1 /â 2 for publicâ 1 and secretâ 2 andâ 3 , with slightly lower complexity. Finally, for publicâ 2 and secretâ 1 andâ 3 , division consists of secure multiplication betweenâ 1 and public 1/â 2 .
Square Root. Protocol 8, SqrtFL, computesâ ≈ |â 1 |, for secretâ 1 ,â ∈ Q FL ,g , |â 1 | =v 1 2p 1 andâ = v2p. SqrtFL is similar to DivFL and surprisingly efficient. The computation is based on the following remark. Letṽ 1 =v 1 2 − ∈ [0.5, 1) ∪ {0}, encoded as v 1 ∈ Q FX , . Also, letp 1 =p 1 + , u =p 1 mod 2, and p 2 = p 1 /2 . Observe that |â 1 | = ṽ 1 2p 1 + , so if u = 0 then |â 1 | = √ṽ 1 2p 2 , otherwise |â 1 | = √ 2ṽ 1 2p 2 = √ 2 2 √ṽ 1 2p 2 +1 . SqrtFL computes √ṽ 1 using Protocol 9, SqrtGS, based on Goldschmidt's square root algorithm (Markstein, 2004 
a and c i ≈ 1 2 √ a with relative error ε 2 i 0 . If a ∈ [0.5, 1), we can take w 0 = 1.7877 − 0.81a, a linear approximation of 1 √ a with relative error ε 0 < 0.0223. Since w 0 provides almost 5.5 exact bits, the algorithm needs θ = log 5.5 iterations for an -bit input. An iteration computesd = int k (0.5) − bc /2 k and thenb =b + bd /2 k andc =c + cd/2 k (steps 8-9 in parallel). The output preserves the higher precision, so that SqrtFL can accurately compute
SqrtFL computes the square root of |â 1 | as follows.
Steps 2-4 computev 2 andv 2 using SqrtGS, and steps 5-6 computep 1 ,p 2 , and u. If u = 0 then |â 1 | =ṽ 2 2p 2 , so we setv = v 2 /2 m andp =p 2 − . Otherwise, |â 1 | =ṽ 2 2p 2 +1 ; we computeμ = int k ( √ 2 2 ) andv 2 = (μv 2 )/2 k and setv = v 2 /2 m andp =p 2 − + 1. The two cases are obliviously computed in steps 7-8:v = (1 − u)v 2 + uv 2 andp =p 2 − + u. The result is already normalized.
The online complexity of SqrtFL is 4 + 2θ rounds and, surprisingly, only 3θ + 7 interactive operations (e.g., θ = 3 for ∈ [24, 45]). SqrtFL is much more efficient than the protocol suggested in (Aliasgari et al., 2013) , that computes Goldschmidt's iterations using floating-point protocols.
Floating-point comparison. Protocol 10, LTFL, computes c = (â 1 <â 2 )? 1 : 0 forâ 1 ,â 2 ∈ Q FL ,g , a 1 = (1 − s 1 )v 1 2p 1 andâ 2 = (1 − s 2 )v 2 2p 2 , with secret inputs and output. The protocol is based on the following idea. Letv 1 = (1 − s 1 )v 1 ,v 2 = (1 − s 2 )v 2 and d =â 1 −â 2 = 2p 2 (v 1 2p 1 −p 2 −v 2 ). We want to compute c = (d < 0)? 1 : 0. Also, let z p = (p 1 =p 2 )? 1 : 0, c − p = (p 1 <p 2 )? 1 : 0, c + p = (p 1 >p 2 )? 1 : 0 and c − v = (v 1 <v 2 )? 1 : 0. Observe thatd < 0 if and only if one of the following mutually exclusive conditions holds:p 1 =p 2 andv 1 <v 2 ;p 1 <p 2 and s 2 = 0;p 1 >p 2 and s 1 = 1. Therefore, the output is c = z p c − v + c − p (1 − s 2 ) + c + p s 1 (inner product). We could compute c − p and z p , using the protocols LTZ and EQZ (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a) , and then c + p = (1 − c − p )(1 − z p ). Instead, we introduce Protocol 11, CmpZ, that computes more efficiently the triple comparison. Thus, we obtain a simpler and more efficient solution for LTFL: steps 1-2 compute c − v using LTZD, step 3 computes c − p , c + p and z p using CmpZ, and step 4 computes the output.
Given a secret integerā ∈ Z k , CmpZ returns the secret bits c 1 = (ā < 0)? 1 : 0, c 2 = (ā > 0)? 1 : 0, and c 3 = (ā = 0)? 1 : 0. CmpZ uses Protocol 12, BitCmp, with input a public integerā = ∑ k i=1 2 i−1 a i and a bitwise-shared integerb = ∑ k i=1 2 i−1 b i , and output the secret bits u 1 = (ā <b)? 1 : 0 and u 2 = (ā =b)? 1 : 0.
CmpZ extends the protocol LTZ to compute the bits c 2 and c 3 , besides c 1 . Steps 1-5 compute c 1 = − ā/2 k−1 exactly like LTZ, except that BitLT is replaced by BitCmp in step 4. Steps 1-3 compute and reveal b = 2 k−1 +ā + r, where r = 2 k−1 r + r is a random secret integer that hidesā with statistical secrecy and r = ∑ k−1 i=1 2 i−1 r i , with {r i } k−1 i=1 uniformly random secret bits. Let b = b mod 2 k−1 and a =ā mod 2 k−1 .
Step 4 computes u 1 = (b < r )? 1 : 0 and u 2 = (b = r )? 1 : 0. Observe that b = a + r − 2 k−1 u 1 , so ā/2 k−1 = (ā − (b − r ))2 −(k−1) − u 1 . Also, u 2 = 1 ifā = 0 orā = −2 k−1 , so c 2 = (1 − c 1 )(1 − u 2 ) and c 3 = (1 − c 1 )u 2 (steps 6-7, in parallel).
BitCmp is similar to the protocol BitLT given in (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a) . Steps 1-5 compute u 1 exactly like BitLT, so we explain only the computation of u 2 .
Step 3 computes p i = ∏ k j=i (d j + 1), for i ∈ [1, k], where d j = a j ⊕ b j . If a = b then p 1 = 1, else p 1 is a power of 2, so u 2 = p 1 mod 2. Steps 5-6 run in parallel, so we obtain u 2 almost for free.
LTFL can also be used to compute the other comparison operators, by observing that c = (â 1 <â 2 )? 1 : 0 = (â 2 >â 1 )? 1 : 0 and 1 − c = (â 1 ≥â 2 )? 1 : 0 = (â 2 ≤â 1 )? 1 : 0. Moreover, it also works when an operand is public, with the same complexity.
The online complexity of BitCmp is 2 rounds and k + 2 interactive operations (1 operation more than BitLT) and CmpZ needs 4 rounds and k + 5 interactive operations. Therefore, the online complexity of LTFL is 5 rounds and + g + 7 interactive operations (steps 2-3 in parallel). This is similar to comparison in Q FX k, f using LTZ (LTFL adds 2 rounds, but usually + g < k, so the communication complexity is lower).
Equality of secretâ 1 ,â 2 ∈ Q FL ,g with secret output can be tested as efficiently as for fixed-point numbers, based on the following remark. Letâ 1 = (1 − s 1 )v 1 2p 1 ,â 2 = (1 − s 2 )v 2 2p 2 , and c = (â 1 =â 2 )? 1 : 0.
Observe thatd s ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and |d v | < 2 . Ifd s = 0 andd p = 0 then 0 < |2 d s +d v | < |2 +1d p |, hence ∆ = 0. Thus, ∆ = 0 if and only if d p = 0,d s = 0, andd v = 0, hence c = (∆ = 0)? 1 : 0.
Protocol 13, EQFL, computes c = (â 1 =â 2 )? 1 : 0 as described above. Its online complexity is 3 rounds and log( + g + 2) + 2 interactive operations, the same as for inputs in Q FX k, f with k > + g.
CONCLUSIONS
A broad range of privacy preserving collaborative applications require efficient secure computation with real numbers (statistical analysis, benchmarking, data mining, and optimizations). Starting from the framework introduced in (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a; Catrina and Saxena, 2010) , we add building blocks and optimizations that alleviate the performance bottlenecks of the previous protocols. We show that secure floating-point arithmetic is substantially improved using a small set of powerful and efficient building blocks (Table 2 ) and protocol constructions.
The online and precomputation complexity of the floating-point protocols is summarized in Table 3 (with θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ [3, 4] for ∈ [24, 56] ). All protocols are specified for secret operands and secret result, in the same security model. However, they can be adapted to also work when one of the operands is public. In some cases, the complexity is significantly lower when part of the input information is not secret, e.g., FX2FL for input with known sign, AddFL for operands with the same sign, DivFL with public divisor.
A challenge for secure arithmetic is to find the best complexity trade-offs, taking into account a complete protocol family and typical applications 3 . We analyzed several variants of floating-point encoding and building blocks. The selection presented in the paper offers better tradeoffs for the round and communication complexity of the entire protocol family. The additional building blocks (PreDiv2m, PreDiv2mP, Int2MaskG, and non-interactive multiplication) improve the performance of the underlying integer and fixed-point arithmetic protocols and allow us to use simpler algorithms in the floating-point protocols.
We focused on performance, accuracy and flexibility, rather than trying to replicate the format and features specified in the IEEE Standard for Floating-Point Arithmetic (IEEE 754). The parameters and g determine the range and precision of the floating numbers, as well as the protocols' communication and computation complexity (the size of the field and the number of interactive operations). All protocols take and g as (implicit) parameters and work accurately, with relative error 2 −( −1) , for the entire range of practically relevant values (including standard simple and double precision). Thus, they can offer the best tradeoff between accuracy and performance, according to application requirements. The protocols were tested using our Java implementation of the secure computation framework discussed in Section 2. Table 4 shows preliminary performance measurements for 3 parties, = 32, g = 10, and log q = 128. The protocols ran on computers with 3.6 GHz CPU, connected to a 1 Gbps LAN. The results show the baseline performance for low-latency and high-bandwidth networks and singlethreaded code. Large batches of primitives can be processed faster by splitting the load among CPU cores. The single-thread code used only a small fraction of the bandwidth 4 . On the other hand, longer network latency means longer interaction rounds. A more comprehensive performance assessment, with broader scope, will be included in future work.
The tests ran the protocols for up to 100 parallel operations. The table lists online and precomputation time per operation. The results of the measurements are well correlated with the complexity, but we expect heavier performance penalty for protocols with larger round complexity in networks with longer transfer de-lays. The online time is clearly much shorter when operations are part of larger batches, so the applications that use algorithms with high parallelism will see important performance improvements.
Floating-point arithmetic protocols are inherently more complex than fixed-point arithmetic protocols. This complexity is partially compensated by more compact data encoding: the protocols run more complex algorithms with smaller integers encoded in smaller fields. Multiplication and comparison protocols have similar performance for floating-point and fixed-point numbers, while floating-point division is faster. On the other hand, secure floating-point addition remains complex and relatively slow.
On-going work, being finalized, shows important performance gains for more complex tasks, like evaluating sums and polynomials, by using dedicated protocols, instead of generic constructions. However, these optimized protocols are slower than the fixedpoint versions, since adding secret-shared fixed-point numbers is just a local addition of field elements.
This suggests combining secure fixed-point and floating-point arithmetic according to application requirements, an approach we are currently studying.
APPENDIX
This appendix provides (for convenience) pseudocode and further details for building blocks presented in previous work and used in this paper.
Given a secret signed integerā ∈ Z k and a public integer m ∈ [1, k − 1], Protocol 14, Div2mP, returns secretā/2 m with probabilistic rounding to nearest (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a) .
Div2mP computesc = ā/2 m + u, for u ∈ {0, 1}. Letd = 2 k−1 +ā andā =ā mod 2 m . Observe that d ≥ 0 andd mod 2 m =ā for any m ∈ [1, k − 1]. The protocol reveals b = d + r, where r = 2 m r + r is a random secret integer that hides d with statistical secrecy and ( r , r , r 1 ) ← PRandM(k, 1);
Protocol 15, Div2m, is a variant that computes a/2 m with deterministic rounding to −∞ (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a) . This is achieved by computing the bit u using the protocol BitLT. The online complexity of Div2m is 3 rounds and m + 2 interactive operations. Div2mP needs a single online interaction, so it is much more efficient. However, certain applications require deterministic rounding. Protocol 16, Div2, is a variant of Div2m optimized for m = 1, that needs a single interactive operation.
Protocol 17, PreDiv2mP, is a generalization of 
The complexity of PreDiv2m is 3 rounds and 2m + 1 interactive operations, so it performs a much more complex task then Div2m with the same round complexity and slightly higher communication complexity. PreDiv2mP needs a single online interaction, so we use it instead of PreDiv2m whenever possible.
The efficient solutions described above are based on Protocol 19, BitLT ("bitwise less than") (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a), and its generalization PreBitLT (Catrina, 2018) .
BitLT computes the secret bit u = (a < b)? 1 : 0 for a non-secret integer a = ∑ k i=1 2 i−1 a i and a bitwiseshared integer b = ∑ k i=1 2 i−1 b i . Steps 1-2 compute d i = a i ⊕ b i and the products p i = ∏ k j=i (d j + 1), for i ∈ [1, k]; SufMul is the protocol PreMul in (Catrina and de Hoogh, 2010a) , with inputs and outputs in inverse order. Observe that d j + 1 = 2 d j , so p i = ∏ k j=i 2 d j = 2 ∑ k j=i d j .
Step 3 computes s = (1 − a k )d k +
(1 − a i )d i 2 ∑ k j=i+1 d j . Assume a = b and let m ≤ k be the secret index of the most significant different bit. The expected result is u = 1 − a m . If m < k, d m = 1 and d i = 0 for all i ∈ [m + 1, k], so s = 1 − a m + 2(1 − a m−1 )d m−1 +2 ∑ m−2 i=1 (1−a i )d i 2 ∑ m−1 j=i+1 d j . The output is u = s mod 2 = 1 − a m . If m = k, then d k = 1 and s = 1 − a k + 2(1 − a k−1 )d k−1 + 2 ∑ k−2 i=1 (1 − a i )d i 2 ∑ k−1 j=i+1 d j .
The output is u = s mod 2 = 1 − a k . Finally, if a = b, the expected result is u = 0. In this case, d i = 0 for all i ∈ [1, k], so s = 0 and the output is u = 0.
Protocol 20, PreBitLT, is an efficient generalization of BitLT: given a non-secret integer a = ∑ k i=1 2 i−1 a i and a bitwise shared integer b = ∑ k i=1 2 i−1 b i , it computes the secret bits
, where a i = ∑ i j=1 2 j−1 a j and b i = ∑ i j=1 2 j−1 b j (Catrina, 2018) . (1 − a i )(p i − p i+1 ) and then u k = s k mod 2.
For u = (a < b )? 1 : 0, with ∈ [1, k − 1], PreBitLT computes s = ∑ i=1 (1 − a i )(p i − p i+1 ).
Since s = ∑ i=1 (1 − a i )d i 2 ∑ k j=i+1 d j and p +1 = 2 ∑ k j= +1 d j , it follows that s = p +1 ((1 − a )d +
. Therefore, we can compute u = (s /p +1 ) mod 2 (like in BitLT). Since p +1 | s , the integer division can be computed in Z q , as s p −1 +1 .
. It extends the protocol PreMul and has the same complexity.
The online complexity of BitLT is 2 rounds and k + 1 interactive operations. PreBitLT needs 2 rounds and 2k interactive operations.
